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Summary –. This paper examines the impact of international remittances on both the 
level and the instability of government tax revenue in receiving countries. It investigates 
in particular whether the presence of a value added tax (VAT) system increases the 
benefit of the inflows of remittances in terms of high and less volatile tax revenue ratio. 
This is supported by the fact that remittances are largely used for consumption 
purposes and contribute to smoothing private consumption. Using a large sample of 
developing countries observed over the period 1980-2006, and even after factoring in 
the endogeneity of remittances and VAT adoption, the results highlight that remittances 
significantly increase both the level and the stability of government tax revenue ratio in 
receiving countries that have adopted the VAT. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important issues faced by developing countries and which is 
raised even more seriously today is finding  ways to improve the internal mobilization of 
domestic resources in order to finance public goods. In a context of degradation of 
public finances in the developed world, the high dependency of developing countries on 
external development assistance should be addressed and reversed by acting on the 
ways to efficiently increase the mobilization of domestic resources. In this vein, looking 
at the ways to improve the mobilization of domestic resources and to build fiscal space 
in these countries is therefore crucial for the sustainability of public finances and for 
economic development in general. 
If the trend is a stagnation of foreign aid and other forms of development 
assistance to developing countries, it is worth noting that, at the same time, developing 
countries receive large amounts of external private transfers, namely migrant 
remittances. Remittances constitute a bulk of resources received by developing 
countries and some scholars argue they represent an external and stable source of 
funding for development (Ratha, 2005). To put some numbers in mind, the level of 
remittances has attained 338 billions of US dollars in 2008. And despite the recent world 
wide crisis, remittances have shown a stronger comparative resilience than the other 
types of financial flows received by developing countries. Moreover, for a number of 
countries, remittances represent the most important source of external funding, going 
beyond the levels of foreign aid or foreign direct investment (Ratha, 2009).  
A number of studies has analyzed the macroeconomic impact of remittances in 
terms of growth, poverty, competitiveness and macroeconomic instability in receiving 
countries. The result showing that remittances significantly reduce poverty rates is 
largely accepted among scholars (Adams, 2005; Gupta et al., 2009). However, the role 
played by remittances in enhancing economic growth is still an open debate. If the direct 
and linear contribution of remittances to economic growth seems difficult to conclude 
(Chami et al., 2009b), their positive effect on economic growth conditioned upon some 
factors (the quality of governance and the financial development) is now recognized 
(Catrinescu et al., 2009; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009; Singh et al., 2009). On average, 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.30 
 
4 
 
remittances also contribute towards reducing the volatility of output and consumption 
in the receiving countries (Chami et al., 2009a; Combes and Ebeke, forthcoming). 
However, these beneficial macroeconomic effects have a price. Remittances can 
appreciate the real exchange rate in countries and therefore reduce their external 
competitiveness (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Acosta et al., 2009).  
In this macroeconomic literature on remittances, little is said about their 
consequences on public policy. Two recent papers, however, have questioned the 
implications of remittance inflows in terms of the sustainability of public finances and 
economic policy management. Abdih et al. (2009) investigated the impact of remittances 
on the sustainability of government debt using Lebanese fiscal data. Their main result is 
that the inclusion of remittances in the traditional analysis of the sustainability of the 
debt alters the amount of fiscal adjustment required to place debt on a sustainable path. 
They argue that one of the ways remittances can affect fiscal sustainability is the 
increase of the tax base. Even if they are not taxed directly, remittance flows may 
indirectly increase the revenue that the government receives from consumption-based 
and trade-based taxation since they contribute to a higher consumption of domestic and 
imported goods. This idea has been empirically confirmed by Abdih et al. (2010) using 
panel data for countries in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. 
Another paper on the link between remittances and public finances is Chami et al. 
(2008). Using a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to match the 
characteristics of Chilean economy, they showed that the use of a tax on labor income 
has the undesirable effect of making the government rely more on inflation to 
appropriate resources as the level of remittances increases. This happens because 
remittances decrease the labor supply and consequently the labor tax base. In contrast, 
when the government uses consumption taxation, an increase in remittances leads to an 
increase in tax revenues through private consumption and the government policy is 
relatively less distortionary. 
The main conclusions of these three recent papers are twofold. Firstly, migrants’ 
remittances might increase the government tax revenue even if they are not directly 
taxed by the government. Secondly, since remittances enter the receiving economy 
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through familial transfers they indirectly affect fiscal policy and the debt sustainability 
through the activities of remittance-receiving households, primarily through their 
consumption and saving decisions. Abdih et al. (2009) stressed that it is in this respect 
that remittances are different from natural resources, which governments may own and 
from which they derive revenue, from foreign and domestic public aid, which directly 
enter the government budget constraint, and from private capital flows that enter 
directly into the production process.    
This paper extends the previous analyses to the whole sample of developing 
countries. It investigates the contribution of remittances to both the level and the 
stability of government tax revenue. Since the effects of remittances on tax revenue are 
essentially indirect (through consumption), this paper therefore examines the role of a 
value added tax system in the relationship between remittances and total tax revenue 
ratio.  
Two main hypotheses are tested. (i) Without taxing remittances directly, 
government can enjoy more tax revenue ratios through the VAT system since 
remittances are largely used for consumption purposes and since the main tax base for 
VAT is consumption. (ii) Given the positive contribution of remittances  to output and 
private consumption smoothing (Chami et al. 2009a; Bugamelli and Paternò, 2009; 
Combes and Ebeke, forthcoming), countries that have adopted a VAT will enjoy less 
volatile tax revenue ratios thanks to remittance inflows.  
This paper raises at least two important debates. Firstly, it explores a new way 
through which the adoption of a VAT could enhance the level of tax revenue. A recent 
paper has shown the positive contribution of the VAT to the domestic resource 
mobilization and its main conclusion is that the VAT is more efficient for tax revenue 
mobilization the more opened the economy is (Keen and Lockwood, 2010). By looking at 
another aspect of globalization with remittances, our study complements earlier papers. 
Secondly, the study examines whether the presence of a VAT is also stabilizing to the 
extent that it enhances the stabilizing contribution of remittances to the tax revenue 
ratio. This question seems important to investigate since previous studies have 
highlighted that the volatility of government tax revenue is quite large for developing 
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countries (Brun et al., 2006) and leads to an instability of government spending (Lim, 
1983; Bleaney et al., 1995; Ebeke and Ehrhart, 2010). To our knowledge, this study is 
the first one that combines remittances and the VAT-based taxation system to analyze 
both the dynamic of the level and the volatility of government revenue in the developing 
world. 
To test the two formulated hypotheses, a large sample of developing countries 
and panel estimators are retained. Whatever the estimator (OLS with fixed effects, Least 
Squares Dummy Variables Corrected estimator, Difference-GMM estimator and System-
GMM estimator), the results do not reject the hypothesis that remittances increase both 
the level and the stability of government tax revenue in presence of a VAT. These results 
are also robust to an alternative definition of workers’ remittances. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric 
models of the relationship between remittances, the level and the volatility of the tax 
revenue ratio. The section also discusses the data that are used and the identification 
strategy. Section 3 presents and discusses the results and the robustness checks that are 
conducted. Section 4 concludes on policy implications.  
2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This section presents the specified econometric models, the methodology that is 
implemented and the data that are used.  
2.1. Tax revenue ratio equation 
The econometric model 
The econometric model of the determinants of the tax revenue ratio is similar to 
previous studies for the choice of control variables (Gupta, 2007; Mahdavi, 2008 and 
Keen and Lockwood, 2010). We add two terms to the traditional model: remittances and 
remittances interacted with a dummy variable for the VAT. More precisely, the 
specification takes the following form: 
titititititititi VVRRXty ,,,,2,1,, εηµλθθβα ++++∗++′+=    (1) 
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where tity ,  is the total tax revenue ratio excluding grants (divided by country GDP), R is 
the remittance ratio (in percentage of GDP) and V a dummy variable which takes the 
value 1 if there is a VAT in each country i  for each year t and 0 otherwise. iµ , tη  and ti ,ε  
are the country-specific effect, time-specific effect and the error term, respectively. X is 
the set of control variables. We control for the share of agriculture in GDP that is 
expected to be negatively correlated with the revenue ratio. It may also serve as a broad 
indicator of informality and economic development. Openness (measured as the sum of 
the GDP shares of imports and exports) is also a candidate: Rodrik (1998), for example, 
finds openness to be positively related to the size of government.2 We also allow 
demographic variables–the proportions of the population aged 14 or younger and 65 or 
over – to play a potential role. These variables may affect the need for the tax revenue to 
support those out of the labor market. Finally, we control for macroeconomic instability 
via the inflation rate (measured as the growth rate of the GDP deflator). 
In equation (1), the hypothesis tested is that 01 ≤θ  and 02 >θ  so that the impact 
of remittances in presence of a VAT ( 21 θθ + ) is positive while the impact of remittances 
on tax revenue ratio in absence of a VAT ( 1θ ) is negative or null.3 
Equation (1) is firstly estimated by ordinarily least squares with country and time 
fixed-effects (OLS-FE). However, this method has important shortcomings in our 
context. It does not allow to take into account the dynamic properties of the dependent 
variable (the tax rate) nor does it deal with the endogeneity of some regressors.4 The 
endogeneity of remittances is of concern here given that altruistic migrants can send 
more remittances in order to maintain the purchasing power of their family in their 
country of origin, especially when the tax burden is too high and reduces the disposal 
                                                           
2 Given the importance to the VAT of collection at border points, one might also expect this variable to 
influence the VAT adoption decision and therefore reduces the selection bias behind the VAT adoption. 
3
 The impact of remittances in a context of no VAT is supposed to be negative or null since remittances can 
reduce labor force participation and therefore reduce the revenue collected from direct taxes (Chami et 
al., 2008). 
4 Indeed, the tax revenue ratio seems strongly autoregressive year by year given the slow dynamic of 
changes in the official tax rates in countries. 
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income. The endogeneity of remittances can also arise in the case of omitted variables. 
For example, the emigration of individuals can directly reduce the labor tax base and 
therefore total tax revenues, and at the same time, it determines the amount of 
remittance inflows.  
The endogeneity of the VAT adoption is due to the main motivation behind this 
reform. Countries choose to adopt a VAT in order to increase the efficiency of the 
revenue mobilization. Therefore, the VAT adoption is highly predetermined.  
To deal with these important issues, we proceed in two steps. Firstly, we adopt a 
dynamic panel specification of the equation (1). By introducing the lagged value of the 
tax revenue ratio, we both control for the inertia of the dependent variable and expect 
reducing the self-selection bias in the VAT adoption. The equation takes the following 
form: 
tititititititititi VVRRXtyty ,,,,2,1,1,, εηµλθθβρα ++++∗++′++= −    (2) 
Given that the OLS-FE estimator is biased due to the presence of both the lagged 
dependent variable and the country fixed-effects, we use the Least Squares Dummy 
Variables Corrected estimator (LSDVCE) a method recently proposed by Kiviet (1995), 
Judson and Owen (1999), Bun and Kiviet (2003), and extended by Bruno (2005), to 
unbalanced panels such as the one used in this study. This method corrects the bias 
associated with dynamic panel data model with fixed-effects. The procedure has to be 
initialized by a consistent estimator to make the correction feasible, since the bias 
approximation depends on the unknown population parameters. In this study, we 
initialize the bias correction with the OLS-FE estimator. However, the main drawback is 
that the estimated asymptotic standard errors may provide poor approximations in 
small samples, possibly generating unreliable t-statistics. The statistical significance of 
the LSDVCE coefficients is therefore tested using bootstrapped standard errors (with 
100 replications). 
The second strategy that we adopt to test the robustnessof our results is to 
control for both the dynamic properties of the tax revenue ratio and the endogeneity of 
the regressors. Hence an econometric strategy based on instrumental variables must be 
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implemented. Equation (2) in level and equation (2) in first differences are combined in 
a system and estimated with an extended GMM estimator system which allows the use 
of lagged differences and lagged levels of the explanatory variables (remittance terms 
and VAT dummy) as instruments (Blundell and Bond, 1998).5  
In order to improve the quality of the instrumentation of the VAT dummy, we 
augment standard GMM estimation techniques by adding an external instrument for the 
VAT dummy: for each country, the external instrument is the lagged share of 
geographical neighbors that have already adopted the VAT for each year t.6 The lagged 
value of this variable is used instead of its current value because imitation and 
neighborhood effects take time. This variable is also interacted with the lagged values of 
remittance ratio to instrument the interactive term of remittances crossed with the VAT 
dummy.  
For robustness checks, we also conduct estimations using the difference-GMM 
estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In this context, equation (2) is firstly differentiated 
to eliminate the fixed-effects and the first-differentiated variables are instrumented by 
the lagged value of these variables in level. However, our preferred results are derived 
from the System-GMM estimator which is asymptotically more efficient in small 
samples.  
Data 
Tax revenue data are drawn from the IMF Government Financial Statistics 
database and from several IMF article IV reports. Data exclude grants and are expressed 
at the General Government level.  
We follow the World Bank in defining remittances as the sum of workers’ 
remittances and employees’ compensation(s). Workers’ remittances properly refer to 
                                                           
5 The paper uses the System-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) for dynamic panel 
data with the Windmeijer (2005) correction for finite sample bias.  
6
 Keen and Lockwood (2010) used a similar variable as an important determinant of the VAT adoption. 
They also showed that the lagged value of tax revenue ratio significantly and negatively determines the 
adoption of the VAT. Thus, by controlling in equation (2) for the lagged value of the tax revenue ratio, we 
reduce the endogeneity of the VAT adoption. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.30 
 
10 
 
current transfers by migrants who are employed and reside in the countries where they 
migrated (destination country); employees’ compensation should comprise wages, 
salaries and other benefits earned by individuals in countries different from their 
resident country (country of origin) and for work performed for and paid by residents of 
the destination countries. We use the sum of these two items because for many 
developing countries the statistical distinction between the two could be highly 
problematic (Bugamelli and Paternò, 2009).  However, in order to check the robustness 
of the results in sub-section 3.3, we test an alternative measure of remittances by using 
the narrower definition (only workers’ remittances).  
VAT dummy is constructed according to the information on the dates of the 
adoption of the VAT that are provided by Ebrill et al. (2001) and updated. All the data for 
the remaining control variables are drawn from World Development Indicators. 
2.2. Tax revenue instability equation 
Econometric model 
The econometric model of the determinants of the instability of tax revenue ratio 
is similar to previous studies for the choice of control variables (Lim, 1983; Bleaney et 
al., 1995 and Ebeke and Ehrhart, 2010). We add two terms to the traditional models: 
remittances and remittances interacted with a dummy variable for the presence of a 
VAT. More precisely, the specification takes the following form: 
tiiiiiiiii VVRRX ,,,,2,1,1,, εηµθγγβφσασ ττττττττ ++++∗++′++= −    (3) 
where τσ ,i  is the standard deviation of the growth rate of the total tax revenue ratio 
(excluding grants)  over the sub-period τ . R is the remittance ratio (in percentage of 
GDP) and V a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if there is a VAT in each country i 
for at least 3 years in a sub-period τ . iµ , τη  and τε ,i  are the country-specific effect, 
time-specific effect and the error term, respectively. X is the set of control variables, 
which includes the standard determinants of macroeconomic volatility such as trade 
openness and the standard deviation of the inflation growth rate (inflation volatility). 
The hypothesis tested is 02 <γ  and ( ) 021 <+ γγ  so that the impact of remittances on the 
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instability of tax revenue is more negative in the presence of a VAT than without a VAT 
( 1γ ). 
We do not control additively for the volatility of the GDP per capita nor for the 
volatility of household consumption because they represent the main channels for 
remittances to stabilize the tax revenue ratio. However, to test the fact that the 
stabilization of private consumption represents the channel for remittances to stabilize 
the tax revenue ratio in a country that has adopted a VAT, we add to   equation (3) the 
standard deviation of household consumption per capita growth rate. If this channel 
works, we would get a reduction in the magnitude (in absolute value) and in the 
significance of the coefficient of the interaction of remittances crossed with the VAT 
dummy.  
The time period of this panel consists of non-overlapping sub-periods of 5 years 
defined as follows: 1980/1984, 1985/1989… 2000/2005. The variables defined as 
standard deviation are computed over each of these sub-periods while the other 
remaining variables are defined in terms of sub-period averages. 
The dynamic specification is retained to catch the inertia of the instability of 
government tax revenue in developing countries. OLS-FE applied to equation (3) leads 
to biased estimates and we therefore retain the system-GMM estimator.  
Endogeneity issues are still of concern here. Regarding remittances, the 
endogeneity can be explained by the fact that they tend to increase in case of negative 
shocks that generate macroeconomic instability and therefore government revenue 
instability. Regarding the VAT, if governments choose this taxation system in order to 
improve the stability of their tax revenues, there is therefore a self-selection bias. By 
controlling for the lagged value of tax revenue instability, we partially reduce this bias. 
However, we will follow the same identification strategy built in the system-GMM 
framework by instrumenting remittances and the VAT dummy by their lagged values 
and the share of geographical neighbors with a VAT, respectively. The interactive term 
of remittances crossed with the VAT dummy is instrumented by the product of lagged 
values of remittances and the share of geographical neighbors that have adopted the 
VAT.  
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Except for the tax revenue data, all the other variables used in equation (3) are 
drawn from the World Bank Tables. Descriptive statistics of all the variables and the list 
of countries included in the sample are reported in the appendix.  
3. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The first set of results concerns the impact of remittances on the level of tax 
revenue ratio. The second set of results describes the contribution of remittances to  the 
stabilization of government tax revenue ratio. 
3.1. Remittances, VAT and the tax revenue ratio 
Table 1 presents the estimations of the impact of remittances on the tax revenue 
ratio. For each estimator used, the Table informs about the linear impact of remittances 
and, in every second column, about the impact conditional on the presence of the VAT.   
Whatever the estimator used, the results indicate that, on average, remittances do 
not have a significant impact on the tax revenue ratio. This can be explained by two 
effects: on the one hand, remittances may increase tax revenue by expanding the private 
demand (consumption of tradable or non-tradable goods, domestic investment). On the 
other hand, remittances could reduce the labor supply and increase leisure time at home 
(Chami et al., 2005). It results a contraction of the domestic production and therefore in 
a sharp decrease in tax revenue ratios for countries that exclusively depend on 
corporate and individual taxes (Chami et al., 2008) but not on VAT. 
Table 1. about here 
The story changes when remittances are interacted with the VAT dummy. 
Whatever the estimator used, the interactive term of remittances is statistically 
significant and exhibits a positive sign. It is important to keep in mind that the 
coefficient of the additive term of remittances identifies the impact of remittances in 
countries without a VAT. The sum of the two coefficients associated with remittances 
gives the impact for countries that have a VAT system. It emerges that the contribution 
of remittances in countries without a VAT is never statistically significant. This is 
consistent with the previous papers already quoted. In contrast, remittances seem to 
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significantly increase the tax revenue ratio when countries have implemented a VAT 
system.7  
When we turn to our preferred estimations by the system-GMM method 
(columns [1.7] and [1.8]), the results indicate that the impact of remittances in country 
with a VAT stands at 0.08. Perhaps a better sense of the quantitative significance of this 
coefficient can be obtained from the following calculation. The median share of the 
remittance ratio in our sample is around 1.8 %GDP. A shift from the median toward the 
75th percentile of the distribution of the remittance ratio (an increase from 1.8 to 5.3 
%GDP) which corresponds to a variation of 3.5 percentage points of GDP would lead to 
an increase in the total tax revenue ratio by 0.3 %GDP in a country that has a VAT 
system.    
3.2. Remittances, VAT and the instability of the tax revenue ratio 
Table 2 presents the estimation of the impact of remittances on the instability of 
the tax revenue ratio. The estimator used is the system-GMM since remittances are 
taken as endogenous and the instability of tax revenue appears strongly autoregressive 
in the sample. Column [2.1] reports the linear (unconditional) impact of remittances on 
the instability of the tax revenue ratio. The results indicate a non significant stabilizing 
effect of remittance inflows.  
In column [2.2], the VAT dummy is introduced additively and in interaction with 
the remittance ratio. Three important results emerge. Firstly, the presence of a VAT 
appears stabilizing. Countries that have adopted a VAT (and whatever their 
characteristics, such as openness, the level of development, governance quality or 
remittance levels), enjoy more stable tax revenue than the others. This result 
complements early studies on the fiscal impact of the VAT adoption. For instance, Keen 
and Lockwood (2010) showed that the VAT adoption is a factor enhancing the efficiency 
of the tax revenue collection.8 Our results indicate that the VAT is not only a determinant 
                                                           
7
 Table 1 reports the sum of the two coefficients associated with remittances and this sum is always 
positive and statistically significant in the case of OLS-FE, LSDVC and System-GMM results. 
8
 More precisely, they showed that the positive effect of the VAT on the tax revenue is conditional on the 
degree of trade openness and the level of economic development.  
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of the level of the tax revenue ratio, but also a tax revenue stabilizer. Since the VAT is 
based on a macroeconomic aggregate (consumption) that is relatively more stable, 
countries that rely on this tax instrument would have less volatile tax revenue. This 
result posits the VAT as an effective determinant of overall fiscal performance 
(measured as the level of mobilization of revenue and the stability of these revenues) in 
developing countries. 
Table 2. about here 
Secondly, the additive term of remittances which measures the impact of these 
flows on the instability of tax revenue in countries without a VAT system, appears not to 
be statistically significant although it is negative. This is in line with our expectations. 
Indeed, if remittances stabilize private consumption over time, countries that do not tax 
consumption via a VAT system would not take advantage of the stabilizing effects of 
remittance inflows on private consumption.  
Thirdly, the results of column [2.2] indicate a stabilizing effect of remittances on 
tax revenue in countries with a VAT. The impact is negative (the sum of the two 
remittances coefficients) and stands around -0.28.9 In column [2.3], we test whether this 
stabilizing contribution of remittances passes through the stabilization of private 
consumption. Hence, the model includes the instability of the household consumption 
per capita growth. As expected, its effect on the tax revenue instability is strongly 
positive and significant. The inclusion of this variable, however, deteriorates the 
significance of the remittance coefficients. This confirms our guess that one of the main 
channels through which remittances could stabilize government tax revenue in 
countries with a VAT system is through their consumption smoothing properties.  
3.3. Robustness checks 
One of the main difficulties that arise in the macroeconometric works on 
remittances is the measurement error in the remittance variable. Remittances data are 
essentially underreported for many countries due to the existence of informal channels. 
                                                           
9 In Table 2, the results of the Wald-test of the joint significance of the two remittance coefficients indicate 
a significant effect at almost 5%. 
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Another concern is the fact that many empirical papers that used World Bank data 
define remittances as the sum of workers’ remittances and employees’ compensations. 
The main justification is that, for many countries, the distinction between workers’ 
remittances and employees’ compensations is difficult to make. Nevertheless, we test 
the robustness of all the previous results, with an alternative definition of remittances 
by only using the narrower definition. We define remittances in this section as current 
transfers by migrants who are employed and resident in the countries where they 
migrated (destination country). Data are drawn from the IMF Balance of Payments 
Yearbook (various editions). As previously, remittance values are normalized by country 
GDP.  
Table 3 reports the results of the impact of remittances on the tax revenue ratio. 
The results appear broadly the same than those of Table 1. When remittances are 
included additively, and whatever the estimator (OLS-FE, GMM), they do not exhibit a 
significant coefficient. In contrast, the conditional effect of remittances on the tax 
revenue ratio is statistically significant. Indeed, the interaction term of remittances is 
positive and significant, and this result confirms the proposition that remittances tend to 
significantly increase the tax revenue ratios in countries that have already adopted a 
VAT system. The contribution of remittances in countries with a VAT stands around 0.05 
(column [3.6] in the case of system-GMM estimations).    
Table 3. about here 
Table 4 reports the results of the impact of remittances on the instability of the 
tax revenue ratio. The results remain qualitatively the same as those of Table 2. The 
inclusion of remittances additively doesn’t lead to any stabilizing effect (column [4.1]). 
However, when the model enables to include the interactive term of remittances crossed 
with the VAT dummy, the stabilizing contribution of remittances is observed. The value 
of the coefficient of remittances for countries that have adopted the VAT (the sum of the 
two remittance coefficients) stands at -0.38 (column [4.2]), a value close to that of Table 
2 (-0.28). In column [4.3], the inclusion of the instability of consumption per capita leads 
to a deterioration of the significance of the coefficients of interest. The consumption 
smoothing channel is then empirically confirmed by the data.  
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Table 4. about here 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper showed robustly that remittances can increase both the level and the 
stability of government tax revenue in receiving countries. However, these positive 
effects on fiscal performance are only conditional on the presence of the value added tax 
system (VAT) in the remittance dependent countries. Even after factoring in the 
endogeneity of remittances and the adoption of the value added tax, or even after using 
an alternative measure of remittances, the results still remained robust. 
The results interestingly add to the positive link between remittances and debt 
sustainability analysis in receiving countries (Abdih et al., 2009). They are important for 
at least two reasons. Firstly, they showed that public authorities can take advantage of 
remittance inflows without taxing them directly, and without creating distortions and 
reducing incentives to remit. The presence of a VAT is therefore useful to capture the 
positive effect of remittances on consumption smoothing. Secondly, we got clear policy 
implications: the adoption of a VAT and measures to increase its effectiveness in 
remittance dependent countries can help build fiscal space given the significant 
coefficient of transformation of remittances into tax revenue in countries that have 
adopted a VAT system. 
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Table 1: Remittances, VAT and the tax revenue ratio. 
Period: 
Unit of observation: 
1980-2006 
Years 
 OLS-FE  LSDVCE  Difference-GMM  System-GMM 
 [1.1] [1.2]  [1.3] [1.4]  [1.5] [1.6]  [1.7] [1.8] 
            
Remittances (% GDP) 0.006 -0.021  0.005 -0.003  0.128 0.057  -0.025 -0.033 
 0.11 0.53  0.56 0.67  1.05 0.76  0.23 0.56 
Remittances * VAT  0.116**   0.042***   0.165*   0.116** 
  2.21   6.52   1.69   2.44 
VAT dummy  -0.859   -0.032   -3.050**   -1.631 
  1.12   0.54   2.13   1.47 
Tax revenue % GDP (t-1)    0.759*** 0.730***  0.656*** 0.593***  0.636*** 0.638*** 
    46.66 69.22  7.95 6.80  7.78 9.86 
Agriculture value added (% GDP) -0.208*** -0.204***  -0.054*** -0.053***  -0.238* -0.471**  -0.253** -0.341*** 
 3.53 3.63  4.33 8.26  1.95 2.57  2.27 2.80 
Trade openness 0.069*** 0.071***  0.030*** 0.032***  -0.053 -0.052  0.018 0.025 
 3.05 3.16  9.12 18.88  1.29 1.25  0.83 1.35 
Population aged 14- (%) 0.076 0.073  0.074*** 0.092***  0.035 0.037  0.290* 0.364** 
 0.50 0.47  3.76 8.27  0.26 0.21  1.77 2.24 
Population aged 65+ (%) -0.417 -0.506  0.230* 0.248***  0.749 -0.361  0.636** 0.709*** 
 0.58 0.78  1.77 3.80  1.36 0.41  2.24 2.58 
log (1+Inflation) -1.109 -1.107  -0.084 -0.114  0.207 -0.117  -1.079* -1.103* 
 1.22 1.22  0.58 1.56  0.47 0.20  1.73 1.85 
Intercept 19.545** 20.135**        -1.760 -2.586 
 2.37 2.56        0.25 0.45 
No observations 1702 1702  1640 1640  1526 1492  1640 1600 
No countries 98 98  98 98  95 95  98 95 
Ho: θ1+θ2=0, p-value  0.093   0.000   0.232   0.016 
θ1+θ2  0.09   0.04   0.222   0.083 
First order serial correlation p-value       0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Second order serial correlation p-value       0.301 0.271  0.204 0.177 
Hansen OID test p-value       0.114 0.214  0.095 0.251 
No instruments       17 22  15 20 
Note: Absolute t-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients. Symbols ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and at 10%. Dependent variable: Total 
tax revenue (excluding grants) in percentage of GDP. LSDVCE means the Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected Estimator initialized by the OLS-FE estimator. In 
the system-GMM and difference-GMM framework, the additive term of remittances is taken as endogenous and instrumented by its lagged values. The VAT dummy and 
the interactive term remittances*VAT are instrumented by the proportion of geographical neighbors with a VAT and by this variable crossed with lagged values of 
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remittances, respectively. Two-steps GMM estimator with the Windmeijer (2005) correction for finite sample bias is implemented. 
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Table 2: Remittances, VAT and the instability of the tax revenue ratio. 
Period 1980-2005 
Unit of observation: Non-overlapping 5-year averages 
 [2.1] [2.2] [2.3] 
    
    
Remittances (%GDP) 0.425 -0.038 -0.004 
 1.02 0.36 0.04 
Remittances * VAT  -0.245* -0.185 
  1.72 1.53 
VAT dummy  -4.525* -2.377 
  1.79 1.07 
Instability of tax revenue (t-1) 0.205 0.297** 0.202** 
 1.52 2.51 2.29 
Trade openness -0.027 -0.007 -0.025* 
 1.36 0.46 1.74 
Instability of inflation rate 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 7.42 15.58 14.49 
Instability of private consumption   0.194** 
   2.16 
Intercept 9.366*** 10.075*** 9.738*** 
 4.76 5.37 5.45 
No observations 269 241 235 
No countries 96 89 87 
Ho: γ1+γ2=0, p-value  0.055 0.161 
γ1+γ2=0  -0.283  
First order serial correlation p-value 0.123 0.093 0.108 
Second order serial correlation p-value 0.275 0.301 0.374 
Hansen OID test p-value 0.215 0.460 0.387 
No instruments 14 20 21 
Note: Absolute t-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients. Symbols ***, 
** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and at 10%. Dependent variable: Instability of total 
tax revenue ratio growth rate (excluding grants). The VAT dummy takes the value 1 if 
there is a VAT in at least 3 years in a considered sub-period and 0 elsewhere. In the system-
GMM and difference-GMM framework, the additive term of remittances is taken as 
endogenous and instrumented by its lagged values. The VAT dummy and the interactive 
term remittances*VAT are instrumented by the proportion of geographical neighbors with 
a VAT and by this variable crossed with lagged values of remittances, respectively. Two-
steps GMM estimator with the Windmeijer (2005) correction for finite sample bias is 
implemented. Time dummies are included in all specifications. 
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Table 3: Remittances (excluding compensations of employees), VAT and the tax revenue ratio. 
Period 1980-2006     
Unit of observation: Years     
 OLS-FE  Difference-GMM  System-GMM 
 [3.1] [3.2]  [3.3] [3.4]  [3.5] [3.6] 
         
Remittances (% GDP) 0.115 0.034  -0.473 -0.059  -0.131 -0.070 
 1.56 0.39  1.44 1.15  1.43 1.27 
Remittances * VAT  0.160*   0.145**   0.122** 
  1.84   2.07   2.05 
VAT dummy  -1.512**   -1.600**   -1.795** 
  2.10   2.32   2.26 
Tax revenue % GDP (t-1)    0.501*** 0.595***  0.612*** 0.598*** 
    3.88 6.99  10.62 11.81 
Agriculture value added (% GDP) -0.212*** -0.217***  -0.401** -0.231**  -0.186 -0.302*** 
 4.70 5.10  2.17 2.51  1.49 2.76 
Trade openness 0.086*** 0.091***  0.037** 0.044***  0.045*** 0.034*** 
 4.10 4.40  2.16 3.17  3.83 2.65 
Population aged 14- (%) 0.133 0.102  0.251* 0.154  0.255 0.322*** 
 0.83 0.65  1.75 1.54  1.58 2.89 
Population aged 65+ (%) -0.861 -0.908  0.206 -0.124  0.608** 0.645*** 
 1.01 1.18  0.36 0.40  2.42 2.98 
log (1+Inflation) -1.131 -1.160  -0.465 -0.367  0.256 0.224 
 1.36 1.41  0.72 0.63  0.58 0.53 
Intercept 17.739* 19.707**     -3.071 -1.390 
 1.89 2.24     0.73 0.39 
No observations 1746 1746  1558 1530  1674 1645 
No countries 96 96  96 96  96 96 
Ho: θ1+θ2=0, p-value  0.025   0.100   0.114 
θ1+θ2  0.194   0.086   0.052 
First order serial correlation p-value    0.003 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Second order serial correlation p-value    0.324 0.218  0.280 0.264 
Hansen OID test p-value    0.688 0.350  0.147 0.368 
No instruments    12 20  12 16 
Note: Absolute t-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients. Symbols ***, ** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and at 10%. Dependent 
variable: Total tax revenue (excluding grants) in percentage of GDP. In the system-GMM and difference-GMM framework, the additive term of 
remittances is taken as endogenous and instrumented by its lagged values. The VAT dummy and the interactive term remittances*VAT are instrumented by 
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the proportion of geographical neighbors with a VAT and by this variable crossed with lagged values of remittances, respectively. Two-steps GMM estimator 
with the Windmeijer (2005) correction for finite sample bias is implemented. 
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Table 4: Remittances (excluding compensations of employees), VAT and the instability of 
the tax revenue ratio. 
Period 1980-2005 
Unit of observation: Non-overlapping 5-year averages 
 [4.1] [4.2] [4.3] 
    
    
Remittances (%GDP) -0.125 0.391 0.283 
 0.64 1.16 0.63 
Remittances * VAT  -0.775** -0.524 
  2.07 1.16 
VAT dummy  -1.252 -2.677 
  0.43 1.00 
Instability of tax revenue (t-1) 0.240** 0.168** 0.168** 
 2.12 1.96 2.51 
Trade openness 0.061 0.089 0.023 
 0.72 0.96 0.23 
Instability of inflation rate 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 6.72 10.26 7.56 
Instability of private consumption   0.186* 
   1.69 
Intercept 6.014 4.607 7.268 
 1.29 0.92 1.60 
No observations 269 252 243 
No countries 93 88 85 
Ho: γ1+γ2=0, p-value  0.024 0.267 
γ1+γ2=0  -0.384  
First order serial correlation p-value 0.114 0.146 0.133 
Second order serial correlation p-value 0.248 0.305 0.400 
Hansen OID test p-value 0.773 0.761 0.796 
No instruments 14 19 20 
Note: Absolute t-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients. Symbols ***, 
** and * means significant at 1%, 5% and at 10%. Dependent variable: Instability of total 
tax revenue ratio growth rate (excluding grants). The VAT dummy takes the value 1 if 
there is a VAT in at least 3 years in a considered sub-period and 0 elsewhere. In the system-
GMM and difference-GMM framework, the additive term of remittances is taken as 
endogenous and instrumented by its lagged values. The VAT dummy and the interactive 
term remittances*VAT are instrumented by the proportion of geographical neighbors with 
a VAT and by this variable crossed with lagged values of remittances, respectively. Two-
steps GMM estimator with the Windmeijer (2005) correction for finite sample bias is 
implemented. Time dummies are included in all specifications. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
 
Summary statistics :  
 Annual observations 
Variables Obs. Mean Std dev. Minimum Maximum 
Tax revenue % GDP 2341 20.38 9.03 1.30 70.90 
Remittances and Compensations % GDP 2463 4.74 8.35 0 90.42 
Remittances % GDP  2561 2.81 5.23 0 41.51 
VAT dummy 3888 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Percentage of other VAT adopters in the region 3888 37.68 28.59 0 100 
Agriculture value added share (%) 3104 23.18 14.51 1.61 93.98 
Trade openness (%) 3181 75.48 39.62 1.53 280.36 
Population aged 65+ (%) 3648 4.89 2.89 1.89 17.32 
Population aged 14- (%) 3648 38.14 8.44 13.57 51.92 
log (100+inflation rate) 3295 0.20 0.47 -0.34 5.59 
 5-year averaged observations 
Tax revenue instability 427 13.38 13.95 0.52 195.78 
Remittances and Compensations % GDP 483 4.52 8.12 0 78.68 
Remittances % GDP  514 2.67 4.86 0 33.15 
VAT dummy 720 0.35 0.48 0 1.00 
Percentage of other VAT adopters in the region 720 35.16 27.14 0 89.58 
Trade openness (%) 606 74.70 38.36 2.35 226.87 
Inflation instability 619 104.00 655.15 0.50 11158.63 
Instability of real private consumption per 
capita growth rate 550 8.44 27.05 0.37 617.30 
 
 
Countries in the sample (98): Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, Central African Rep., Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, 
Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Rep., Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Rep., Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, 
Uganda, Ukraine, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen Rep., Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
